Clubs and the market: Large finite economies

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 101, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 40-77

  Ellickson, Bryan ^a   Grodal, Birgit ^b   Scotchmer, Suzanne ^c   Zame, William R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Approximate cores; Approximate decentralization; Approximate equilibrium; Clubs; cores

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035207375     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2795     Document Type: Article

References (26)

1. An elementary core equivalence theorem
2. Strong core theorems with nonconvex preferences
3. Markets with a continuum of traders
4. Existence of competitive equilibrium in markets with a continuum of traders
5. A critique of Tiebout's theory of local public expenditures
6. An economic theory of clubs
7. Valuation equilibria with clubs
8. Equivalence of the core and competitive equilibrium in a Tiebout economy with crowding types
9. A generalization of the pure theory of public goods
10. Competitive equilibrium with local public goods
11. Clubs and the market
12. The core and the hedonic core: Equivalence and comparative statics
13. Decentralization in replicated club economies
14. Existence of approximate cores with incomplete preferences
15. On approximate cores of non-convex economies
16. Existence of approximate equilibria and cores
17. Continuity properties of the core of a market
18. Cores and clubs
19. Profit-maximizing clubs
20. On price-taking equilibrium in club economies with nonanonymous crowding
21. Competitive equilibrium and the core in club economies with anonymous crowding
22. A pure theory of local expenditures
23. Stability of jurisdictional structures in economies with a local public good