Stability and preference alignment in matching and coalition formation

Econometrica

Volumn 80, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 323-362

  Pycia, Marek ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Assortative matching; Coalition formation; Complementarities; Consistency; Core; Many to one matching; Nash bargaining; Peer effects; Sharing rules; Stability

Indexed keywords

EID: 84855722905     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: 14680262     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3982/ECTA7143     Document Type: Article

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