Corrigendum to "Stable matchings and preferences of couples" [J. Econ. Theory 121 (1) (2005) 75-106] (DOI:10.1016/j.jet.2004.04.006);Stable matchings and preferences of couples

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 121, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 75-106

  Klaus, Bettina ^a   Klijn, Flip ^b  

^a UNIVERSITAT AUTÒNOMA DE BARCELONA   (Spain)

^b Barcelona)   (Spain)

Author keywords

Couples; Matching; Responsiveness; Stability; Weak responsiveness

Indexed keywords

EID: 13944250381     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2009.06.001     Document Type: Erratum

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