Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 115, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 358-376

  Echenique, Federico ^a   Oviedo, Jorge ^b  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL DE SAN LUIS   (Argentina)

Author keywords

Algorithm; Complexicity; Core; Lattice; Matching; Stability; Substitutability; Tarski's fixed point theorem

Indexed keywords

EID: 1942478320     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00184-4     Document Type: Article

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