The pro-competitive effect of campaign limits in non-majoritarian elections

Economic Theory

Volumn 49, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 591-619

  Iaryczower, Matias ^a   Mattozzi, Andrea ^b  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITAT AUTÒNOMA DE BARCELONA   (Spain)

Author keywords

Campaign limits; Campaign spending; Elections; Political parties

Indexed keywords

EID: 84858295520     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: 14320479     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-011-0613-y     Document Type: Article

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