Decisiveness of contributors' perceptions in elections

Economic Theory

Volumn 49, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 571-590

  Morton, Rebecca B ^a   Myerson, Roger B ^b  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

Campaign spending; Electoral equilibria; Policy divergence

Indexed keywords

EID: 84858295024     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: 14320479     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-011-0605-y     Document Type: Article

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