Information and strategic political polarisation

Economic Journal

Volumn 118, Issue 530, 2008, Pages 845-874

  Carrillo, Juan D ^a   Castanheira, Micael ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITÉ LIBRE DE BRUXELLES   (Belgium)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ELECTION; INFORMATION; MODELING; THEORETICAL STUDY; VOTING BEHAVIOR;

EID: 43049144090     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: 14680297     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02152.x     Document Type: Article

References (35)

1. Alesina, A. and Rosenthal, H. (1995). Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2. Aragonés, E. and Palfrey, T. (2002). 'Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate', Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 103, pp. 131-61.
3. Baer, K.S. and Cherny, A. (2006). 'Swing ideas, not swing voters', The Democratic Strategist, available at http://www.thedemocraticstrategist.org/premiere/baercherny.php.
4. Bernhardt, D. and Ingberman, D. (1985). 'Candidate reputations and the "incumbency effect"', Journal of Public Economics, vol. 27(1), pp. 47-67.
5. Besley, T. and Coate, S. (1997). 'An economic model of representative democracy', Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 112(1), pp. 85-114.
6. Black, D. (1958). The Theory of Committees and Elections, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
7. Caillaud, B. and Tirole, J. (1999). 'Party governance and ideological bias', European Economic Review, vol. 43(4-6), pp. 779-89.
8. Caillaud, B. and Tirole, J. (2002). 'Parties as political intermediaries', Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 117(4), pp. 1453-89.
9. Calvert, R. (1985). 'Robustness of the multidimensional voting model: candidates's motivations, uncertainty and convergence', American Political Science Review, vol. 29(1), pp. 69-95.
10. Castanheira, M. (2003). 'Why vote for losers?', Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 1(5), pp. 1207-38.
11. Castanheira, M., Crutzen, B. and Sahuguet, N. (2005). 'Party governance and political competition with an application to the American direct primary', CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4890.
12. Downs, A. (1957). 'An economic theory of political action', Journal of Political Economy, vol. 65, pp. 135-50.
13. Ferejohn, J. (1986). 'Incumbent performance and electoral control', Public Choice, vol. 50, pp. 5-26.
14. Galston, W.A. and Kamarck, E.C. (2005). The Politics of Polarization, Washington: Third Way.
15. Groseclose, T. (2001). 'A model of candidate location when one candidate has a quality advantage', American Journal of Political Science, vol. 45(4), pp. 862-86.
16. Guesnerie, R. and Laffont, J.-J. (1984). 'A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm', Journal of Public Economics, vol. 25, pp. 329-69.
17. Holmström, B. (1999). 'Managerial incentive problems: A dynamic perspective', Review of Economic Studies, vol. 66(1), pp. 169-82.
18. Kartik, N. and McAfee, R.P. (2007). 'Signaling character in electoral competition', American Economic Review, vol. 97(3), pp. 852-70.
19. Laffont, J.-J. and Tirole, J. (1986). 'Using cost observation to regulate firms', Journal of Political Economy, vol. 94(3), pp. 614-41.
20. Larcinese, V. (2007). 'The instrumental voter goes to the news-agent: demand for information, marginality and the media', Journal of Theoretical Politics, vol. 19(3), pp. 249-76.
21. McCarty, N., Poole, K. and Rosenthal, H. (2006). Polarized America:.The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
22. Palfrey, T. (1984). 'Spatial equilibrium with entry', Review of Economic Studies, vol. 51(1), pp. 139-56.
23. Persson, T., Roland, G. and Tabellini, G. (1997). 'Separation of powers and political accountability', Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 112(4), pp. 1163-202.
24. Persson, T., Roland, G. and Tabellini, G. (1998). 'Towards micropolitical foundations of public finance', European Economic Review, vol. 42, pp. 685-94.
25. Persson, T., and Tabellini, G. (2000). Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
26. Poole, K. and Rosenthal, H. (1991). 'Patterns of congressional voting', American Journal of Political Science, vol. 35, pp. 228-78.
27. Poole, K. and Rosenthal, H. (1997). Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting, New York: Oxford University Press.
28. Rivière, A. (2000). 'Citizen candidacy, party formation and Duverger's law', Royal Holloway, mimeo.
29. Roemer, J. (1997). 'Political-economic equilibrium when parties represent constituents: The unidimensional case', Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 14(4), pp. 479-502.
30. Roemer, J. (2001). Political Competition. Theory and Applications, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
31. Rogoff, K. (1990). 'Equilibrium political budget cycles', American Economic Review 80(1), pp. 21-36.
32. Stokes, D. (1963). 'Spatial models of political competition', American Political Science Review, vol. 57(2), pp. 368-77.
33. Strömberg, D. (2004a). 'Radio's impact on public spending', Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 119(1), pp. 189-221.
34. Strömberg, D. (2004b). 'Mass media competition, political competition, and public policy', Review of Economic Studies, vol. 71(1), pp. 265-84.
35. Wittman, D. (1983). 'Candidate motivation: A synthesis of alternatives', American Political Science Review, vol. 77, pp. 142-57.