Intuitions, Counter-Examples, and Experimental Philosophy

Review of Philosophy and Psychology

Volumn 1, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 447-460

  Deutsch, Max ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85027928315     PISSN: 18785158     EISSN: 18785166     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s13164-010-0033-0     Document Type: Article

References (28)

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