Is experimental philosophy philosophically significant?

Philosophical Psychology

Volumn 23, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 377-389

  Alexander, Joshua ^a  

^a SIENA COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Epistemology; Experimental philosophy; Intuitions

Indexed keywords

EID: 77954122266     PISSN: 09515089     EISSN: 1465394X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2010.490943     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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