Democracies only: When do IMF agreements serve as a seal of approval?

Review of International Organizations

Volumn 7, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 33-58

  Bauer, Molly E ^a   Cruz, Cesi ^a   Graham, Benjamin A T ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Domestic political institutions; FDI; IMF; Investment; Regime type; Treatment effects

Indexed keywords

EID: 84856502438     PISSN: 15597431     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11558-011-9122-9     Document Type: Article

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