Read my lips: The role of information transmission in multilateral reform design

Journal of International Economics

Volumn 84, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 86-98

  Marchesi, Silvia ^a,b   Sabani, Laura ^c   Dreher, Axel ^d,e,f,g  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MILANO BICOCCA   (Italy)

^b Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano   (Italy)

^c UNIVERSITY OF FLORENCE   (Italy)

^d UNIVERSITY OF GÖTTINGEN   (Germany)

^e KOF SWISS ECONOMIC INSTITUTE   (Switzerland)

^f IZA ^*  (Germany)

^g CESIFO   (Germany)

Author keywords

Communication; Delegation; IMF conditionality; Ownership

Indexed keywords

COMMUNICATION; CONDITIONALITY; ECONOMIC REFORM; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; IMF; THEORETICAL STUDY; TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE;

EID: 79955015014     PISSN: 00221996     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2010.11.008     Document Type: Article

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