Catalytic finance: When does it work?

Journal of International Economics

Volumn 70, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 161-177

  Morris, Stephen ^a   Shin, Hyun Song ^b  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Catalytic finance; Debtor adjustment; IMF; Moral hazard; Sovereign debt

Indexed keywords

DEBT CRISIS; DEVELOPING WORLD; IMF;

EID: 33748034702     PISSN: 00221996     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2005.06.014     Document Type: Article

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