A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems

Economics Letters

Volumn 51, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 185-189

  Shin, Sungwhee ^a   Suh, Sang Chul ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR   (Canada)

Author keywords

Matching; Stable rule; Strong Nash equilibrium

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030144273     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(96)00805-1     Document Type: Article

References (11)

1. Alcalde, J., 1993, Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems, Mimeo, Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona.
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3. Gale, D. and L. Shapley, 1962, College admissions and the stability of marriage, American Mathematical Monthly 69, 9-15.
4. Kara, T and T. Sönmez, 1994, Implementation of the stable rule of the matching games in Nash equilibria, mimeo, University of Rochester.
5. Ma, J., 1995, Stable matchings and rematching-proof equilibria in a two-sided matching market, Journal of Economic Theory 66, 352-369.
6. Maskin, E., 1977, Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality, mimeo, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
7. Maskin, E., 1979, Implementation and strong Nash-equilibrium, in: J-J. Lafont, ed., Aggregation and revelation of preferences (North-Holland, Amsterdam).
8. Maskin, E., 1985, The theory of implementation in Nash equilibrium: A survey, in: L. Hurwicz, D. Schmeidler and H. Sonnenschein, eds., Social goals and social organization: Essays in memory of Elisha Pazner (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK).
9. Moulin, H. and B. Peleg, 1982, Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory, Journal of Mathematical Economics 10, 115-145.
10. Roth, A. and M. Sotomayor, 1990, Two-sided matching: Stability and incentives (Cambridge University Press, New York).
11. Suh, S., 1995, An algorithm for checking strong Nash implementability, University of Windsor, Journal of Mathematical Economics, in press.