Collective action for local commons management in rural Yunnan, China: Empirical evidence and hypotheses using evolutionary game theory

Land Economics

Volumn 88, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 181-200

  Ito, Junichi ^a  

^a KYOTO UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMETRICS; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; GAME THEORY; IRRIGATION SYSTEM; LOCAL GOVERNMENT; RURAL AREA; STAKEHOLDER;

CHINA; YUNNAN;

EID: 84855585986     PISSN: 00237639     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3368/le.88.1.181     Document Type: Article

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