Social capital and community governance

Economic Journal

Volumn 112, Issue 483, 2002, Pages

  Bowles, Samuel ^a   Gintis, Herbert ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SIENA   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS; GOVERNANCE APPROACH; PROPERTY RIGHTS; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0036867721     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.00077     Document Type: Article

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