Chapter 24 Common-pool resources and institutions: Toward a revised theory

Handbook of Agricultural Economics

Volumn 2, Issue PART A, 2002, Pages 1315-1339

  Ostrom, Elinor ^a  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

common pool resources; comparative case studies; institutional analysis; laboratory experiments; Q28; self organized user groups

Indexed keywords

EID: 47549111505     PISSN: 15740072     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0072(02)10006-5     Document Type: Review

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