Affirmative action in contest games

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 28, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 105-118

  Franke, Jörg ^a  

^a TU DORTMUND UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Affirmative action; Asymmetric contest; Discrimination

Indexed keywords

EID: 84855192943     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.07.002     Document Type: Article

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