Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants

Economic Theory

Volumn 52, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 589-630

  Franke, Jörg ^a   Kanzow, Christian ^b   Leininger, Wolfgang ^a   Schwartz, Alexandra ^b  

^a TU DORTMUND UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WÜRZBURG   (Germany)

Author keywords

Contest design; Contest theory; Level playing field

Indexed keywords

EID: 84875553526     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: 14320479     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-011-0657-z     Document Type: Article

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