Allocation efficiency in a competitive bribery game

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 42, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 109-124

  Clark, Derek J ^a,b   Riis, Christian ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TROMSØ   (Norway)

^b BI NORWEGIAN BUSINESS SCHOOL   (Norway)

Author keywords

Allocation efficiency; Bribery; C72; Discrimination; O17

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042779974     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-2681(00)00077-9     Document Type: Article

References (9)

1. Beck P.J., Maher M.W. A comparison of bribery and bidding in thin markets. Economics Letters. 20:1986;1-5.
2. Clark, D.J., Riis, C., 1996. Rank-Order Tournaments and Selection, Memorandum No. 27. Department of Economics, University of Oslo, Norway, August.
3. Heidenheimer, A., 1970. Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis. Holt, Rinchart & Winston, New York.
4. Leys C. What is the problem about corruption? Journal of Modern African Studies. 3:1965;215-230.
5. Lien D. A note on competitive bribery games. Economics Letters. 22:1986;337-341.
6. Lien D. Corruption and allocation efficiency. Journal of Development Economics. 33:1990;153-164.
7. McMullan M. A theory of corruption. Sociological Review. 9:1961;181-200.
8. O'Keeffe M., Kip Viscusi W., Zeckhauser R.J. Economic contests: comparative reward schemes. Journal of Labour Economics. 2(1):1984;27-56.
9. Rose-Ackerman S. The economics of corruption. Journal of Public Economics. 4:1975;187-203.