Influencing rent-seeking contests

Public Choice

Volumn 135, Issue 3-4, 2008, Pages 291-300

  Ritz, Robert A ^a  

^a NUFFIELD COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Asymmetric contests; Contest design; Effort costs; Entry decisions; Red tape

Indexed keywords

EID: 42449107734     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-007-9263-9     Document Type: Article

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