Total effort, competitive balance and the optimal contest success function

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 22, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 1009-1013

  Runkel, Marco ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

^b CESIFO   (Germany)

Author keywords

Competitive balance; Contest success function; Effort

Indexed keywords

EID: 33749652372     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2005.11.006     Document Type: Article

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