Are bid preferences benign? The effect of small business subsidies in highway procurement auctions

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 91, Issue 7-8, 2007, Pages 1591-1624

  Marion, Justin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Affirmative action; Auction; Discrimination; Procurement

Indexed keywords

EID: 34249694918     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.12.005     Document Type: Article

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