Arrest efficiency and the fourth amendment

Minnesota Law Review

Volumn 95, Issue 6, 2011, Pages 2035-2098

  Richardson, L Song ^a  

^a DEPAUL UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84055190741     PISSN: 00265535     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (216)

1. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997, 1002 (2006). For related work exploring the effects of situational factors on behavior
2. see, for example, Adam Benforado, Frames of Injustice: The Bias We Overlook, 85 IND. L.J. 1333 (2010)
3. and Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1 (2004).
4. See generally Symposium on Behavioral Realism, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945 (2006).
5. Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, A Future History of Implicit Social Cognition and the Law 2 (Aug. 12, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1458678
6. see also Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, and Their Behavioral Manifestations, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 143, 144 (2004) (describing the evolution of social cognition).
7. For a comprehensive history of the science of implicit bias and critiques, see John T. Jost et al., The Existence of Implicit Bias Is Beyond Reasonable Doubt: A Refutation of Ideological and Methodological Objections and Executive Summary of Ten Studies that No Manager Should Ignore, 29 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 39, 42-46 (2009).
8. See Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of Affirmative Action, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (2006).
9. See, e.g., Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969 (2006)
10. Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1571-72 (2005)
11. But see Andrew E. Taslitz, Police Are People Too: Cognitive Obstacles to, and Opportunities for, Police Getting the Individualized Suspicion Judgment Right, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7 (2010). Other criminal procedure scholars have highlighted the need to pay more attention to social science.
12. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Transparent Adjudication and Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 733, 736 (2000) ("The most current and reliable empirical and social scientific evidence must inform the normative judgments at the heart of constitutional criminal procedure.")
13. see also David A. Harris, What Criminal Law and Procedure Can Learn from Criminology Symposium, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 1, 3 (2009)
14. Eric J. Miller, Putting the Practice into Theory, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 31, 33 (2009).
15. This phrase is borrowed from Andrew Gelman et al., An Analysis of the New York City Police Department's "Stop-and-Frisk" Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 813, 821 (2007).
16. Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of the Economics, Civil Liberties, and Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal Profiling More Generally, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1276 (2004).
17. Most jurisdictions do not gather data on police stops, searches, and frisks, and thus do not have the data necessary to calculate hit rates. R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1075, 1102 (2001)
18. David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial Profiling and Stops and Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296, 304-06 (2001). In fact, law enforcement agencies frequently and vociferously object to data collection efforts.
19. UNIV. OF MINN. INST. ON RACE & POVERTY, MINNESOTA STATEWIDE RACIAL PROFILING REPORT 36 (2003), available at http://www1.umn.edu/irp/racialprof/ aggregate%20report%2092303.pdf.
20. IAN AYRES & JONATHAN BOROWSKY, A STUDY OF RACIALLY DISPARATE OUTCOMES IN THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 8 (2008), available at http://www.aclu-sc.org/documents/view/47.
21. Statistics gathered by the New York Police Department for the first nine months of 2009 demonstrate that eighty-four percent of pedestrians stopped were either black or Hispanic. Bob Herbert, Jim Crow Policing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2010, at A26, available at 2010 WLNR 2156316. Yet, only 1.6 percent of the blacks and 1.5 percent of the Hispanics stopped were found in possession of contraband. Police stopped whites far less (about sixteen percent of the time), but found contraband 2.2 percent of the time.
22. Jim Dwyer, Whites Smoke Pot, but Blacks Are Arrested, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2009, at A24, available at 2009 WLNR 25781059 (noting that in 2008, blacks were seven times more likely and Latinos four times more likely than whites to be arrested for marijuana possession, even though whites were the heaviest users of marijuana)
23. see also Amanda Geller & Jeffrey Fagan, Pot as Pretext: Marijuana, Race and the New Disorder in New York City Street Policing, 7 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 591, 604-24 (2010) (analyzing data on marijuana arrests in New York City and finding unwarranted disparities).
24. ALEXANDER WEISS & DENNIS P. ROSENBAUM, ILLINOIS TRAFFIC STOPS STATISTICS STUDY 12-13 (2008), available at http://www.dot.state.il.us/ travelstats/ITSS%202008%20Annual%20Report.pdf ("[P]olice are 1.6 times more likely to find contraband in the vehicle driven by a Caucasian driver.").
25. "African Americans and Latinos were much more likely to be stopped by police and much more likely to be searched once stopped, even though Whites were more likely to be found with contraband." ACLU, THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC PROFILING IN THE UNITED STATES 62 (2009)
26. citing AMY FARRELL & JACK MCDEVITT, RHODE ISLAND TRAFFIC STOP STATISTICS DATA COLLECTION STUDY 2004-2005, at 79 (2006)), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/humanrights/cerd-finalreport.pdf.
27. A 2007 report found that blacks were sixty-six percent more likely than whites to be stopped, and 1.79 times more likely to be searched than whites. The hit rates for contraband were twenty-three percent for whites and 17.6 percent for blacks. Executive Summary on 2007 Missouri Vehicle Stops, MO. ATT'Y GEN., http://ago.mo.gov/racialprofiling/2007/racialprofiling2007.htm (last visited May 6, 2011).
28. Blacks and Latinos are 1.5 times more likely to be stopped than whites, and 2.5 times more likely to have their vehicles searched despite the fact that minority drivers are less likely to have contraband. West Virginia Traffic Stop Study: 2009 Final Report, W. VA. DIVISION JUST. & COMMUNITY SERVICES, http://www.djcs.wv.gov/SAC/Pages/WVTrafficStopStudy.aspx (last visited May 6, 2011).
29. see also Donna Coker, Addressing the Real World of Racial Injustice in the Criminal Justice System, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827, 836-39 (2003) (describing a study showing that while officers sought search warrants for drugs more often for blacks, the success rates for finding drugs was higher for whites).
30. See, e.g., Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About Adolescent Offenders, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 483, 500 (2004) (finding that both black and white probation and police officers have implicit biases against black juveniles)
31. Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 949-52 (2006)
32. Kristin A. Lane et al., Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427, 439-44 (2007)
33. Brian A. Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit Attitudes and Stereotypes, 18 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 20 (2007)
34. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1197-201 (2009). For a fascinating discussion on the myriad of ways to conceptualize racial bias and the absence of definitional consensus
35. see R. Richard Banks et al., Discrimination and Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal Society, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1182-89 (2006).
36. See Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer's Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1325 (2002) [hereinafter Correll, Dilemma]
37. Patricia G. Devine & Andrew J. Elliot, Are Racial Stereotypes Really Fading? The Princeton Trilogy Revisited, 21 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1139, 1146-49 (1995)
38. John F. Dovidio et al., Racial Stereotypes: The Contents of Their Cognitive Representations, 22 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 22, 32-36 (1986)
39. Joachim Krueger, Personal Beliefs and Cultural Stereotypes About Racial Characteristics, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 536, 545-47 (1996).
40. See Birt L. Duncan, Differential Social Perception and Attribution of Intergroup Violence: Testing the Lower Limits of Stereotyping of Blacks, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 590, 591 (1976)
41. This phrase is borrowed from Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987). In his groundbreaking article, Professor Lawrence introduced the science of unconscious racism based upon psychoanalytic theory and discussed its application to the law. As the title of his article suggests, he urged scholars and judges to "[r]eckon[] with unconscious racism."
42. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical Role of Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893, 1908-11 (2009)
43. Cynthia Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471, 536-49 (2008)
44. Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 354 (2007)
45. Justin D. Levinson et al., Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias: The Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187, 190-98 (2010)
46. Rigel C. Oliveri, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Landlords, Latinos, Anti-Illegal Immigrant Ordinances, and Housing Discrimination, 62 VAND. L. REV. 55, 74-77 (2009)
47. Symposium on Behavioral Realism, supra note 4.
48. For a recent critique of unconscious bias, see Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter? Law, Politics, and Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053 (2009).
49. See, e.g., Jamie L. Flexon et al., Exploring the Dimensions of Trust in the Police Among Chicago Juveniles, 37 J. CRIM. JUST. 180, 182 (2009) (noting the "paucity of research on Latinos' responses to police contacts").
50. ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION 17-18 (1999)
51. Susan T. Fiske & Steven L. Neuberg, A Continuum of Impression Formation, from Category-Based to Individuating Processes: Influences of Information and Motivation on Attention and Interpretation, 23 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 4, 23-24 (1990) (describing studies which demonstrate that categorization occurs immediately). For a summary of automaticity, including methods for testing it
52. see Irene V. Blair, The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice, 6 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 242 (2002).
53. see also Frederica R. Conrey et al., Separating Multiple Processes in Implicit Social Cognition: The Quad Model of Implicit Task Performance, 89 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 469, 470 (2005) (arguing that most tasks involve both automatic and controlled processes)
54. Patricia G. Devine & Lindsay B. Sharp, Automaticity and Control in Stereotyping and Prejudice, in HANDBOOK OF PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING, AND DISCRIMINATION 61, 76-77 (Todd D. Nelson ed., 2009) (describing how increased control by gathering additional information or correction by overcoming bias can lead to reduced automatic stereotypical activation).
55. Activation refers to "the extent to which a stereotype is on one's mind." Ziva Kunda & Lisa Sinclair, Motivated Reasoning with Stereotypes: Activation, Application, and Inhibition, 10 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 12, 14 (1999).
56. see David L. Hamilton & Jeffrey W. Sherman, Stereotypes, in 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNITION 1, 40-42 (Robert S. Wyer, Jr. & Thomas K. Srull eds., 2d ed. 1994).
57. See Laurie A. Rudman et al., "Unlearning" Automatic Biases: The Malleability of Implicit Prejudice and Stereotypes, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 856, 857 n.1 (2001).
58. See John A. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait Construct and Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 230 (1996)
59. see also Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1144-45 (2000)
60. Jerry Kang, Denying Prejudice: Internment, Redress, and Denial, 51 UCLA L. REV. 933, 956 (2004)
61. For a discussion of the behavioral effects of implicit bias, see David M. Amodio & Patricia G. Devine, Stereotyping and Evaluation in Implicit Race Bias: Evidence for Independent Constructs and Unique Effects on Behavior, 91 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 652, 653-54 (2006).
62. Sophie Trawalter et al., Attending to Threat: Race-Based Patterns of Selective Attention, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1322, 1326-27 (2008).
63. Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 881, 883, 885-87 (2004) (finding that research subjects, primed with crime-related words or photographs below the level of conscious awareness, were drawn to black faces earlier and for longer time periods than to white faces).
64. E.g., Matthew D. Lieberman et al., An fMRI Investigation of Race-Related Amygdala Activity in African-American and Caucasian-American Individuals, 8 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 720, 721 (2005). The strength of amygdale activation correlates with implicit bias scores related to racial attitudes.
65. Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Performance on Indirect Measures of Race Evaluation Predicts Amygdala Activation, 12 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 729, 730-33 (2000). Researchers found stronger amygdala responses when they presented the pictures of black faces subliminally.
66. William A. Cunningham et al., Separable Neural Components in the Processing of Black and White Faces, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 806, 809 (2004) (finding that the stronger reactions were correlated significantly with scores from the Implicit Association Test (IAT)-a test which reveals implicit biases)
67. Allen J. Hart et al., Differential Response in the Human Amygdala to Racial Outgroup vs Ingroup Face Stimuli, 11 NEUROREPORT 2351, 2353 (2000) (demonstrating that subjects showed greater amygdala activation to outgroup faces)
68. Andreas Olsson et al., The Role of Social Groups in the Persistence of Learned Fear, 309 SCIENCE 785, 785-86 (2005) (demonstrating that humans more readily show a fear response to outgroup members)
69. Damian Stanley et al., The Neural Basis of Implicit Attitudes, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 164, 165 (2008) (noting that amygdala activation is associated with fear).
70. But see Mary E. Wheeler & Susan T. Fiske, Controlling Racial Prejudice: Social-Cognitive Goals Affect Amygdala and Stereotype Activation, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 56, 61 (2005) (demonstrating that amygdala activation to outgroup members is not inevitable). Researchers have also found that a variety of physiological responses occur when whites are exposed to blacks, including sweating, increased heart rate, facial twitches, and increased eye blink.
71. Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Imaging Race, 60 AM. PSYCHOL. 181, 183 (2005) [hereinafter Eberhardt, Imaging Race].
72. Nicole C. Donders et al., Danger Stereotypes Predict Racially Biased Attentional Allocation, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1328, 1332 (2008).
73. Accessibility refers to how quickly and easily a particular idea or concept comes to mind, consciously or nonconsciously. SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION: FROM BRAINS TO CULTURE 60 (2008) ("[F]requently activated ideas come to mind more easily than ideas that have not been activated.").
74. See, e.g., Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 7-8 (1989) (demonstrating that nonconscious activation of negative black racial stereotypes results in evaluating ambiguous behavior as aggressive).
75. H. Andrew Sager & Janet Ward Schofield, Racial and Behavioral Cues in Black and White Children's Perceptions of Ambiguously Aggressive Acts, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 590, 595-96 (1980).
76. Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Ambiguity in Social Categorization: The Role of Prejudice and Facial Affect in Race Categorization, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 342, 342-45 (2004) (Pubitemid 38706676)
77. see also Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Facing Prejudice: Implicit Prejudice and the Perception of Facial Threat, 14 PSYCHOL. SCI. 640, 643 (2003) (demonstrating that implicit bias scores predicted how long it took white participants to judge when a hostile expression on a black face became nonhostile).
78. B. Keith Payne, Weapon Bias: Split-Second Decisions and Unintended Stereotyping, 15 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 287, 287 (2006) (noting that split-second decisions limit individual ability to control for racial bias caused by racial stereotypes).
79. Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1006, 1020-22 (2007) [hereinafter Correll, Thin Blue Line] (finding that although police officers activate negative black stereotypes, they do not exhibit shooter bias to the same extent as civilians, and suggesting that this is the result of their extensive training).
80. Phillip Atiba Goff et al., Not Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge, Historical Dehumanization, and Contemporary Consequences, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 292, 293 (2008).
81. Carl O. Word et al., The Nonverbal Mediation of Self-Fulfilling Prophecies in Interracial Interaction, 10 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 109, 112 (1974).
82. John A. Bargh & Paula Pietromonaco, Automatic Information Processing and Social Perception: The Influence of Trait Information Presented Outside of Conscious Awareness on Impression Formation, 43 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 437, 438-39 (1982)
83. Mark Chen & John A. Bargh, Nonconscious Behavioral Confirmation Processes: The Self-Fulfilling Consequences of Automatic Stereotype Activation, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 541, 542 (1997).
84. David L. Hamilton & Tima K. Trolier, Sterotypes and Sterotyping: An Overview of the Cognitive Approach, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 150, 150 (John F. Dovido & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986) ("Given the perceiver's awareness of the confirmatory nature of the target's behavior and lack of awareness of his or her own role in producing it, it would seem particularly difficult to convince the perceiver that his or her stereotypic beliefs are wrong.").
85. see also Eric J. Vanman et al., The Modern Face of Prejudice and Structural Features that Moderate the Effect of Cooperation on Affect, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 941, 947 (1997) (demonstrating that whites asked to imagine working with black partners rated blacks more favorably, yet their involuntary physical responses, as measured with electromyography (EMG), were indicative of negative affect).
86. see also John A. Bargh, The Automaticity of Everyday Life, 10 ADVANCES SOC. COGNITION 3 (1997)
87. John A. Bargh, The Four Horsemen of Automaticity: Awareness, Intention, Efficiency, and Control in Social Cognition, in 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNITION, supra note 32, at 1, 1-2
88. Daniel T. Gilbert, Thinking Lightly About Others: Automatic Components of the Social Inference Process, in UNINTENDED THOUGHT 189, 194 (James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh eds., 1989)
89. James S. Uleman et al., People as Flexible Interpreters: Evidence and Issues from Spontaneous Trait Inference, 28 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 211, 215-16 (1996) (describing and reviewing literature on spontaneous trait inference).
90. For a more recent treatment discussing both automatic and controlled processes from a dual-process model perspective, see generally Timothy D. Wilson et al., A Model of Dual Attitudes, 107 PSYCHOL. REV. 101 (2000).
91. Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 383, 385 (2006)
92. see also Irene V. Blair et al., The Influence of Afrocentric Facial Features in Criminal Sentencing, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 674, 677 (2004) (finding that intrarace inmates with more Afrocentric features received longer sentences despite the same criminal histories)
93. Robert W. Livingston & Marilynn B. Brewer, What Are We Really Priming? Cue-Based Versus Category-Based Processing of Facial Stimuli, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 17 (2002) (finding that individuals showed more implicit bias when viewing blacks who had more "prototypic" features).
94. See, e.g., Irene V. Blair et al., Imagining Stereotypes Away: The Moderation of Implicit Stereotypes Through Mental Imagery, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 828, 837 (2001) (discussing mental imagery studies that demonstrate that stereotypes are malleable)
95. Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of Automatic Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images of Admired and Disliked Individuals, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 800, 806-07 (2001).
96. But see Jennifer A. Joy-Gaba & Brian Nosek, The Surprisingly Limited Malleability of Implicit Racial Evaluations, 41 SOC. PSYCHOL. 137, 137 (2010) (finding that while malleability was shown after exposure to counterstereotypical racial group members, the effects were weak).
97. Susan T. Fiske, Intent and Ordinary Bias: Unintended Thought and Social Motivation Create Casual Prejudice, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 117, 123-24 (2004).
98. See, e.g., Brian S. Lowery et al., Social Influence Effects on Automatic Racial Prejudice, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 842, 852 (2001)
99. see also Nilanjana Dasgupta, Mechanisms Underlying the Malleability of Implicit Prejudice and Stereotypes: The Role of Automaticity and Cognitive Control, in HANDBOOK OF PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING, AND DISCRIMINATION, supra note 30, at 267, 278-79.
100. For an extended and thoughtful discussion of techniques to increase "accountability-based policing" to address racial profiling, including suggestions for police training, see DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE 145-207 (2002). In many important ways, Harris's suggestions acknowledge the importance of "situationism," the recognition in social psychology that the situation and the pressures they impose have a more influential effect on behavior than a person's "disposition" or personality.
101. See generally Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129 (2003)
102. Some argue that the differential treatment of blacks is not evidence of explicit or implicit bias. Rather, it simply reflects differential crime rates. See, e.g., Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023, 1036 n.41 (2006). There are a number of responses to this. First, the statistics on hit rates suggest that we should be cautious about making this claim. Second, as Angela Davis has argued, it is difficult to use arrest statistics as evidence of criminality when the process of arrest involves so much discretion that "arrest statistics may both overestimate and underestimate actual criminal behavior. Furthermore, because no uniform method of documenting an officer's decision not to arrest exists, we cannot know the extent to which such decisions skew the arrest statistics currently used as evidence of criminality within particular racial groups."
103. Angela J. Davis, Benign Neglect of Racism in the Criminal Justice System, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1660, 1662 (1996)
104. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination," Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 848 (2003) ("The prohibition of rational discrimination is a central component of antidiscrimination doctrine - and it may be the most important aspect of antidiscrimination law on the ground."). For additional responses in the literature challenging the claim that it is rational to focus law enforcement attention on blacks because there is a relationship between race and crime
105. see generally KATHERYN RUSSELL-BROWN, THE COLOR OF CRIME 53-74 (2d ed. 2009)
106. and Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 790-801 (1994).
107. see State of Ohio v. Richard D. Chilton and State of Ohio v. John W. Terry: The Suppression Hearing and Trial Transcripts, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1387, 1449 (1998) [hereinafter Suppression Hearing].
108. Lewis R. Katz, Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five: A Revisionist View, 74 MISS. L.J. 423, 430 (2004).
109. Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 964 (1999).
110. Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Terry v. Ohio, The Warren Court, and the Fourth Amendment: A Law Clerk's Perspective, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 891, 894 (1998) ("[N]o one really suggested that Officer McFadden in Terry had 'probable cause' to believe much of anything.").
111. As other scholars have noted, Chief Justice Warren's opinion was not crystal clear on the appropriate standard for conducting a stop and frisk. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio's Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1271, 1308-09 (1998) [hereinafter Maclin, Legacy]. However, the Terry decision now stands for the proposition that reasonable suspicion is the guiding standard for stops and frisks.
112. See, e.g., John J. Bursch, Note, The 4 R's of Drug Testing in Public Schools, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1221, 1227 n.39 (1996).
113. Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 363-65 (1998) [hereinafter Maclin, Race] (citations omitted). The Kerner Commission found that "'[n]egroes firmly believe that police brutality and harassment occur repeatedly in Negro neighborhoods. This belief is unquestionably one of the major reasons for intense Negro resentment against the police.'"
114. quoting REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 158 (1968).
115. See, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 43 (2009) (arguing that Terry and Whren help create and maintain racialized spaces)
116. Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 1035-36 (2002)
117. Frank Rudy Cooper, "Who's the Man?": Masculinities Studies, Terry Stops, and Police Training, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 671, 675 (2009)
118. David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 681 (1994) [hereinafter Harris, Factors] (describing the profiling of high-crime neighborhoods)
119. David A. Harris, Frisking Every Suspect: The Withering of Terry, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 6 (1994) [hereinafter Harris, Frisking]
120. Lenese C. Herbert, Bête Noire: How Race-Based Policing Threatens National Security, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 149, 155-57 (2003) (critiquing doctrinal failures to address race-based policing)
121. Andrew D. Leipold, Objective Tests and Subjective Bias: Some Problems of Discriminatory Intent in the Criminal Law, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 559, 568-69 (1998)
122. Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Racial Profiling of African-American Males: Stopped, Searched, and Stripped of Constitutional Protection, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 439, 443 (2004).
123. See Alex Geisinger, Rethinking Profiling: A Cognitive Model of Bias and Its Legal Implications, 86 OR. L. REV. 657, 678 (2007) (discussing cognitive biases and the regulatory response to racial profiling).
124. E. Ashby Plant & B. Michelle Peruche, The Consequences of Race for Police Officers' Responses to Criminal Suspects, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 180, 182 (2005)
125. see also DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE 47-51 (1999).
126. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214, 233-34 (1983). These profiles often contain race as a relevant factor.
127. Morgan Cloud, Search and Seizure by the Numbers: The Drug Courier Profile and Judicial Review of Investigative Formulas, 65 B.U. L. REV. 843, 854 (1985).
128. See Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood Stigma and the Social Construction of "Broken Windows," 67 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 319, 336 (2004) (concluding that race plays a stronger role in perception of disorder than does actual observations of disorder).
129. Jamie Barden et al., Contextual Moderation of Racial Bias: The Impact of Social Roles on Controlled and Automatically Activated Attitudes, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 21 (2004) (noting that the effect of viewing stereotyped individuals in certain settings increases implicit bias).
130. Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 651, 733 (2003) (same)
131. David A. Harris, Using Race or Ethnicity as a Factor in Assessing the Reasonableness of Fourth Amendment Activity: Description, Yes; Prediction, No,73 MISS. L.J. 423, 428-35 (2003) (same).
132. Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 430 (1997)
133. There is one study that supports the idea that more experienced officers may rely less on stereotypes in their judgments. See B. Michelle Peruche & E. Ashby Plant, The Correlates of Law Enforcement Officers' Automatic and Controlled Race-Based Responses to Criminal Suspects, 28 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 193, 198 (2006). In this study, "there was a marginally significant effect of years on the force in predicting the degree of racial bias on the shooting simulation. More years in the law enforcement profession was related to less racial bias on the early trials . . . ."
134. Myron Rothbart et al., Recall for Confirming Events: Memory Processes and the Maintenance of Social Stereotypes, 15 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 343, 343-44 (1979)
135. see also Claudia E. Cohen, Person Categories and Social Perception: Testing Some Boundaries of the Processing Effects of Prior Knowledge, 40 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 441, 444-48 (1981) (describing a study in which subjects were more likely to remember stereotype-consistent information).
136. see also Jonathan A. Fugelsang & Kevin N. Dunbar, A Cognitive Neuroscience Framework for Understanding Causal Reasoning and the Law, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC'Y LONDON 1749, 1751 (2004), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1693458/pdf/15590615.pdf ("Several studies have found that individuals appear to have great difficulty evaluating evidence that is inconsistent with their beliefs . . . . The typical finding is that people are more likely to attend to, seek out and evaluate evidence that is consistent with their beliefs and ignore or downplay evidence that is inconsistent with their beliefs." (citations omitted)). Remarkably, cognitive neuroscientists have found that different brain structures are involved in evaluating evidence that is consistent with prior expectations versus evidence that is inconsistent.
137. See Charles M. Judd & Bernadette Park, Definition and Assessment of Accuracy in Social Stereotypes, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 109, 112 (1993) (noting that people remember more information about others that confirms their stereotypes than information that is either irrelevant or disconfirms their preconceptions).
138. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1195 (1995) (defining an "illusory correlation" as "the report by observers of a correlation between two classes of events which, in reality, (a) are not correlated, or (b) are correlated to a lesser extent than reported, or (c) are correlated in the opposite direction from that which is reported" (citation omitted)).
139. For a general discussion, see Joshua Klayman & Young-Won Ha, Confirmation, Disconfirmation, and Information in Hypothesis Testing, 94 PSYCHOL. REV. 211 (1987).
140. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 417 (1974) ("A paramount purpose of the [F]ourth [A]mendment is to prohibit arbitrary searches and seizures as well as unjustified searches and seizures.")
141. Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 201 (1993) [hereinafter Maclin, Central Meaning] ("[T]he central meaning of the Fourth Amendment is distrust of police power and discretion.")
142. David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 286.
143. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 808 (1994) ("Even if racially disparate impact alone does not violate the Constitution, surely equal protection principles call for concern when Blacks bear the brunt of a government search or seizure policy. Thus, in a variety of search and seizure contexts, we must honestly address racially imbalanced effects and ask ourselves whether they are truly reasonable.")
144. See I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835, 843 (2008) (noting the Clinton Administration's recognition of this perception)
145. Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Consequences, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 645, 646 (2004) (noting these problems and their effect on predominantly black, low-income communities)
146. Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 237 (2008) (noting that minorities have low levels of trust and confidence in the police).
147. See generally PAUL BUTLER, LET'S GET FREE (2009).
148. David K. Shipler, Living Under Suspicion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1997, at A33, available at 1997 WLNR 4891728.
149. For a powerful discussion of dignitary harms and the Fourth Amendment, see generally Andrew E. Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect: From Elian to the Internment, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2257 (2002).
150. Margo J. Monteith et al., Suppression as a Stereotype Control Strategy, 2 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 63, 72 (1998) (describing individuation as "actively seeking out individuating information about a person and forming impressions of the person based on this information").
151. See generally Andrew E. Taslitz, What Is Probable Cause, and Why Should We Care? The Costs, Benefits, and Meaning of Individualized Suspicion, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 145 (2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1549898 (discussing the importance of individualized suspicion). For an inventive rethinking of the probable cause standard that might prevent its dilution
152. see Max Minzner, Putting Probability Back into Probable Cause, 87 TEX. L. REV. 913 (2009).
153. Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1332-33 (1990) (opining that the reasonable suspicion standard no longer has a place in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
154. For a more complete discussion of this proposal, see L. Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 87 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2012).
155. See Christopher Slogobin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 82-84 (1991) (noting and responding to this critique).
156. But see Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth Amendment 75-76 (John M. Loin Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 530, 2010), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1665562 (arguing that the phrase "individualized suspicion" should be abandoned because it is inaccurate).
157. See generally ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A HISTORY OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 1789-1868 (2006) (examining the importance of individualized justice in the history of the Fourth Amendment).
158. See Al Baker, City Minorities More Likely to Be Frisked, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2010, at A1, available at 2010 WLNR 9862586.
159. see also John A. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effect of Trait Construct and Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 230, 231 (1996) ("Preconscious activation of mental representations develops from their frequent and consistent activation in the presence of a given stimulus event in the environment.").
160. See generally Richard M. Shiffrin & Walter Schneider, Controlled and Automatic Human Information Processing: II. Perceptual Learning, Automatic Attending, and a General Theory, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 127, 185 (1977) (describing the learning of automatic attending).
161. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 68 (1991). Interestingly, psychological experiments also support the view that advocating a colorblind perspective increases racial biases.
162. See Galen V. Bodenhausen et al., Controlling Prejudice and Stereotyping, in HANDBOOK OF PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING, AND DISCRIMINATION, supra note 30, at 111, 126-27 (citing studies).
163. See Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339, 340 (2000) (discussing how "law changes behavior by signaling the underlying attitudes of a community or society").
164. Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 460-61 (2001).
165. See Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination, in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 364-67 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998) (describing rapid and automatic categorization)
166. Mark Schaller et al., Fear of the Dark: Interactive Effects of Beliefs About Danger and Ambient Darkness on Ethnic Stereotypes, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 637, 647 (2003) (noting that darkness increases the activation of danger stereotypes)
167. Daniel M. Wegner & Ralph Erber, The Hyperaccessibility of Suppressed Thoughts, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 903, 911 (1992)
168. see also Sei Jin Ko et al., Sneaking in Through the Back Door: How Category-Based Stereotype Suppression Leads to Rebound in Feature-Based Effects, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 833, 833-34 (2008) (discussing how reduction in one type of stereotype can increase other stereotypes)
169. C. Neil Macrae et al., Out of Mind but Back in Sight: Stereotypes on the Rebound, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 808, 808-09 (1994) (considering whether people can successfully suppress stereotypical thoughts)
170. C. Neil Macrae et al., Saying No to Unwanted Thoughts: Self-Focus and the Regulation of Mental Life, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 578, 578 (1998) (discussing the ability to self-regulate stereotypical thoughts).
171. But see Margo J. Monteith et al., Suppression as a Stereotype Control Strategy, 2 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 63, 70-72 (1998) (concluding that people with egalitarian values may be less susceptible to rebound effects).
172. B. Keith Payne et al., Best Laid Plans: Effects of Goals on Accessibility Bias and Cognitive Control in Race-Based Misperceptions of Weapons, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 384, 388 (2002).
173. see also Charles Stangor, The Study of Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination Within Social Psychology: A Quick History of Theory and Research, in HANDBOOK OF PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING, AND DISCRIMINATION, supra note 30, at 1, 11 (citing studies demonstrating that conscious and implicit stereotyping can be reduced with practice denying stereotypical beliefs and by designing legal remedies to reduce reliance on stereotypes)
174. C. Neil Macrae et al., On the Activation of Social Stereotypes: The Moderating Role of Processing Objectives, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 471, 482 (1997). Researchers surmised that the first task made gender salient, resulting in automatic stereotype activation.
175. Gretchen B. Sechrist & Charles Stangor, Perceived Consensus Influences Intergroup Behavior and Stereotype Accessibility, 80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 645, 651 (2001).
176. See, e.g., R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing and the Drug War, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571, 594 (2003) ("Drug enforcement efforts that burden some racial minorities may also disproportionately benefit those racial minorities whose neighborhoods are most plagued by drug dealing and its associated problems.")
177. see also RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW 19 (1997) ("[T]he principal injury suffered by African-Americans in relation to criminal matters is not overenforcement but underenforcement of the laws.")
178. Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1775-76 (2006) (emphasizing the importance of recognizing the destructive implications of underenforcement).
179. see also Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why the "War on Drugs" Was a "War on Blacks", 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 381, 391-412 (2002) (describing the disproportionate arrests and sentences of blacks during the war on drugs).
180. See, e.g., Bernd Wittenbrink et al., Spontaneous Prejudice in Context: Variability in Automatically Activated Attitudes, J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 815, 820 (2001) (noting that exposure to gang incidents increased implicit biases)
181. Laura A. Rudman & Matthew R. Lee, Implicit and Explicit Consequences
182. This section does not discuss all the studies that have implications for debiasing the police. For instance, some studies demonstrate that motivation can reduce stereotype activation. See, e.g., Patricia G. Devine et al., The Regulation of Explicit and Implicit Race Bias: The Role of Motivations to Respond Without Prejudice, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 835, 845 (2002) (showing people with high internal motivation were more nonprejudiced). These findings suggest that changing incentive structures within police departments may be an effective way to reduce implicit biases. Furthermore, people who are committed to egalitarian goals may be able to control stereotype activation.
183. See, e.g., Michael Johns et al., Internal Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice and Automatic Egalitarian Goal Activation, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1514, 1518 (2008) ("Together, these studies provide converging evidence that individuals who avoid prejudice because it is personally important to them, and not because of perceived social pressures, automatically activate egalitarian goals to help minimize expression of implicit race bias.")
184. William W. Maddux et al., Saying No to Negativity: The Effects of Context and Motivation to Control Prejudice on Automatic Evaluative Responses, 41 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 19, 33 (2005) (those who are motivated to control prejudice reactions have automatized control strategies to avoid prejudice)
185. Gordon B. Moskowitz et al., Preconscious Control of Stereotype Activation Through Chronic Egalitarian Goals, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 167, 181-82 (1999) (activation of stereotypes can be controlled by egalitarian goals)
186. Gordon B. Moskowitz et al., Preconsciously Controlling Stereotyping: Implicitly Activated Egalitarian Goals Prevent the Activation of Stereotypes, 18 SOC. COGNITION 151, 171 (2000) (showing that exposure to a member of a stereotyped group leads the egalitarian goal construct to be implicitly activated in some people)
187. see also Leslie R.M. Hausmann & Carey S. Ryan, Effects of External and Internal Motivation to Control Prejudice on Implicit Prejudice: The Mediating Role of Efforts to Control Prejudiced Responses, 26 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 215, 222 (2004) (finding that those with internal motivations to be nonprejudiced show decreased implicit biases compared to those who are only externally motivated).
188. Patricia G. Devine & Margo J. Monteith, Automaticity and Control in Stereotyping, in DUAL PROCESS THEORIES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 346 (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999)
189. Jack Glaser & Eric D. Knowles, Implicit Motivation to Control Prejudice, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 164, 171 (2008)
190. Leonard S. Newman & James S. Uleman, Assimilation and Contrast Effects in Spontaneous Trait Inference, 16 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 224, 236 (1990)
191. Fritz Strack et al., Awareness of the Influence as a Determinant of Assimilation Versus Contrast, 23 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 53, 59 (1993).
192. David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving While Black" Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 268-69 (1999) (quoting two police officers).
193. Paul Butler, Rehnquist, Racism, and Race Jurisprudence, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1019, 1042 (2006).
194. Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: III, Meta-Analysis of Predictive Validity, 97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 17, 32 (2009). This meta-analysis included 122 studies and 14,900 research subjects and demonstrated that IAT scores predicted behaviors in the black-white discrimination context better than explicit reports individual's did.
195. PROJECT IMPLICIT, http://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit (last visited May 6, 2011).
196. See Adam Benforado, Quick on the Draw: Implicit Bias and the Second Amendment, 89 OR. L. REV. 1 (2010).
197. See, e.g., E. Ashby Plant et al., Eliminating Automatic Racial Bias: Making Race Non-Diagnostic for Responses to Criminal Suspects, 41 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 141, 154 (2005). Note that in this study, participants were civilians and not officers.
198. B. Michelle Peruche & E. Ashby Plant, Racial Bias in Perceptions of Athleticism: The Role of Motivation in the Elimination of Bias, 24 SOC. COGNITION 438, 448-49 (2006).
199. But see Anthony J. Bishara & B. Keith Payne, Multinomial Process Tree Models of Control and Automaticity in Weapon Misidentification, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 524, 531 (2009) (concluding tentatively that controlled processes, more than automatic processes, control weapon misidentification).
200. Brandon D. Stewart & B. Keith Payne, Bringing Automatic Stereotyping Under Control: Implementation Intentions as Efficient Means of Thought Control, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1332, 1334, 1342 (2008).
201. CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM 224 (2003).
202. Kerry Kawakami et al., Just Say No (to Stereotyping): Effects of Training in the Negation of Stereotypic Associations on Stereotype Activation, 78 J. PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. 871, 876 (2000). The effect only lasted for twenty-four hours.
203. But see Bertram Gaw-Wronski et al., When "Just Say No" Is Not Enough: Affirmation Versus Negation Training and the Reduction of Automatic Stereotype Activation, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 370, 375 (2008) (finding that affirmation reduced automatic stereotype activation while negation training enhanced activation).
204. R. Richard Banks et al., Race, Crime, and Antidiscrimination, in BEYOND COMMON SENSE: PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 3, 16 (Eugene Borgida & Susan T. Fiske eds., 2008).
205. see also Stephen C. Wright et al., The Extended Contact Effect: Knowledge of Cross-Group Friendships and Prejudice, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 73, 74 (1997) (having crossracial friendships can improve racial attitudes).
206. Nilanjana Dasgupta & Luis M. Rivera, When Social Context Matters: The Influence of Long-Term Contact and Short-Term Exposure to Admired Outgroup Members on Implicit Attitudes and Behavioral Intentions, 26 SOC. COGNITION 112, 119-21 (2008)
207. David W. Johnson & Roger T. Johnson, The Three Cs of Reducing Prejudice and Discrimination, in REDUCING PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION 239, 249 (Stuart Oskamp ed., 2000) (explaining that fostering cooperation versus competition helps to reduce racial bias).
208. See, e.g., Fletcher A. Blanchard et al., Condemning and Condoning Racism: A Social Context Approach to Interracial Settings, 79 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 993, 995 (1994) (finding that social influence strongly affects reactions to racism and noting that opinions of racism may derive from a lack of interracial experience)
209. Fletcher A. Blanchard et al., Reducing the Expression of Racial Prejudice, 2 PSYCHOL. SCI. 101, 103 (1991) (noting that vocalization of biased attitudes can affect the behavior of others)
210. Norman Miller, Personalization and the Promise of Contact Theory, 58 J. SOC. ISSUES 387, 391-92 (2002)
211. Linda R. Tropp & Thomas F. Pettigrew, Differential Relationships Between Intergroup Contact and Affective and Cognitive Dimensions of Prejudice, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1145, 1154-56 (2005) (finding that contact between racial groups is an important factor in affecting responses to outgroup members).
212. See, e.g., P.J. Henry & Curtis D. Hardin, The Contact Hypothesis Revisited: Status Bias in the Reduction of Implicit Prejudice in the United States and Lebanon, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 862, 867 (2006) (finding that contact with lower status outgroup members has a reduced effect in diminishing biases of higher status ingroup members)
213. Jennifer A. Richeson & Nalini Ambady, Effects of Situational Power on Automatic Racial Prejudice, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 177, 181-82 (2003) (finding that the anticipation of interacting with a higher status outgroup member reduces bias, but anticipated interactions with lower status outgroup members does not)
214. Stacey Sinclair et al., Social Tuning of Automatic Racial Attitudes: The Role of Affiliative Motivation, 89 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 583, 584 (2005) (noting that those in superior positions are less likely to adjust their perceptions to match those in inferior positions).
215. But see Jennifer A. Richeson & Nalini Ambady, Who's in Charge? Effects of Situational Roles on Automatic Gender Bias, 44 SEX ROLES 493, 506 (2001) (noting that when men interact with women in a superior position their bias increases)
216. Linda Sinclair & Ziva Kunda, Reactions to a Black Professional: Motivated Inhibition and Activation of Conflicting Stereotypes, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 885, 888 (1999) (receiving criticism from an outgroup member can increase implicit biases).