Game theory and public policy

Game Theory and Public Policy

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages

  McCain, Roger A ^a  

^a DREXEL UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 82955249216     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Book

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