The asymptotic strategyproofness of scoring and Condorcet consistent rules

Review of Economic Design

Volumn 7, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 331-340

  Baharad, Eyal ^a   Neeman, Zvika ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA   (Israel)

^b Boston University   (United States)

^c HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 1542591995     PISSN: 14344742     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s100580200077     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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