Oscillatory dynamics in the coevolution of cooperation and mobility

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 287, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 42-47

  Suzuki, Shinsuke ^a,b   Kimura, Hiromichi ^c  

^a RIKEN BRAIN SCIENCE INSTITUTE   (Japan)

^b HOKKAIDO UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

^c Tome R and D Inc   (Japan)

Author keywords

Altruism; Cooperation; Mobility; Positive assortment; Prisoner's dilemma game

Indexed keywords

ALTRUISM; COEVOLUTION; COGNITION; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; MOBILITY; NATURAL SELECTION; PRISONER DILEMMA;

ARTICLE; COEVOLUTION; COGNITION; COOPERATION; MEMORY; NATURAL SELECTION; OSCILLATION; PHYSICAL MOBILITY; POPULATION DYNAMICS; PRIORITY JOURNAL; SIMULATION;

ALTRUISM; ANIMALS; BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; GAME THEORY; HUMANS; MODELS, GENETIC; MOVEMENT; POPULATION DENSITY; SELECTION, GENETIC;

EID: 81155159012     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: 10958541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.07.019     Document Type: Article

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