Evolutionary stability of first-order-information indirect reciprocity in sizable groups

Theoretical Population Biology

Volumn 73, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 426-436

  Suzuki, Shinsuke ^a   Akiyama, Eizo ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TSUKUBA   (Japan)

Author keywords

ESS; Image scoring; Indirect reciprocity; n person prisoner's dilemma; Reputation

Indexed keywords

COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; EVOLUTION; EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGY; GAME THEORY; PRISONER DILEMMA; RECIPROCITY;

ARTICLE; EVOLUTION; HUMAN; HUMAN RELATION; THEORETICAL MODEL;

EVOLUTION; HUMANS; INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS; MODELS, THEORETICAL;

EID: 41149150690     PISSN: 00405809     EISSN: 10960325     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2007.12.005     Document Type: Article

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