Chaos, oscillation and the evolution of indirect reciprocity in n-person games

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 252, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 686-693

  Suzuki, Shinsuke ^a,b   Akiyama, Eizo ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TSUKUBA   (Japan)

^b RIKEN BRAIN SCIENCE INSTITUTE   (Japan)

Author keywords

Chaos; Cooperation; Indirect reciprocity; Oscillation; Reputation

Indexed keywords

BIOLOGY; CHAOTIC DYNAMICS; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; ECONOMICS; EVOLUTION; GAME THEORY; PRISONER DILEMMA; PSYCHOLOGY; RECIPROCITY;

ARTICLE; CHAOTIC DYNAMICS; COOPERATION; EVOLUTION; GAME; OSCILLATION; PRIORITY JOURNAL;

ANIMALS; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; EVOLUTION; GAME THEORY; MODELS, BIOLOGICAL; MUTATION; NONLINEAR DYNAMICS;

EID: 44449161949     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: 10958541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.02.007     Document Type: Article

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