Equilibria of plurality voting with abstentions

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 347-356

  Desmedt, Yvo ^a,b   Elkind, Edith ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AIST   (Japan)

^c NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY   (Singapore)

Author keywords

abstention; sequential voting; voting equilibria

Indexed keywords

NASH EQUILIBRIA; PLURALITY VOTING; PURE NASH EQUILIBRIUM;

TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 77954698257     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1807342.1807398     Document Type: Conference Paper

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