Where are the really hard manipulation problems? The phase transition in manipulating the veto rule

IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 324-329

  Walsh, Toby ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EMPIRICAL STUDIES; HIGHLY-CORRELATED; NP-HARD; PROBABILITY CURVES; SMOOTH TRANSITIONS; VOTING RULES;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

EID: 78751680249     PISSN: 10450823     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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