Complexity of safe strategic voting

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 6386 LNCS, Issue M4D, 2010, Pages 210-221

  Hazon, Noam ^a   Elkind, Edith ^b  

^a BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^b NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY   (Singapore)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COALITIONAL MANIPULATIONS; COMPUTATIONAL ASPECTS; COMPUTATIONAL PROPERTIES; HARDNESS RESULT; NEW MODEL; STRATEGIC VOTING; VOTING RULES;

ALGORITHMS;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 78649570418     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4_19     Document Type: Conference Paper

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