Stackelberg voting games: Computational aspects and paradoxes

Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 2, Issue , 2010, Pages 921-926

  Xia, Lirong ^a   Conitzer, Vincent ^a  

^a Duke University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

BACKWARD INDUCTION; COMPUTATIONAL ASPECTS; DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING ALGORITHM; EXTENSIVE-FORM GAMES; PERFECT INFORMATIONS; SPACE REQUIREMENTS; VOTING GAME; VOTING RULES;

DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING;

EID: 77958546366     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (13)

1. Battaglini, M. 2005. Sequential voting with abstention. Games and Economic Behavior 51:445-463.
2. Bender, E. A., and Williamson, S. G. 2006. The Foundations of Combinatorics with Applications. Dover.
3. Chevaleyre, Y.; Lang, J.; Maudet, N.; and Ravilly-Abadie, G. 2009. Compiling the votes ofa subelectorate. In IJCAI, 97-102.
4. Dekel, E., and Piccione, M. 2000. Sequential voting procedures in symmetric binary elections. JPE 108:34-55.
5. Desmedt, Y, and Elkind, E. 2010. Equilibria of plurality voting with abstentions. In EC.
6. Farquharson, R. 1969. Theory of Voting. Yale University Press.
7. Gibbard, A. 1973. Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result. Econometrica 41:587-602.
8. McKelvey, R. D., and Niemi, R. G. 1978. A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures. JET 18(1): 1-22.
9. Moulin, H. 1979. Dominance solvable voting schemes. Econometrica 47':1337'-51.
10. Moulin, H. 1991. Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making. Cambridge University Press.
11. Satterthwaite, M. 1975. Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions. JET 10:187-217.
12. Sloth, B. 1993. The theory of voting and equilibria in noncooperative games. Games and Econ. Behavior 5:152-169.
13. Xia, L., and Conitzer, V. 2010. Compilation complexity of common voting rules. In AAAI.