An empirical study of the manipulability of single transferable voting

Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications

Volumn 215, Issue , 2010, Pages 257-262

  Walsh, Toby ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EMPIRICAL STUDIES; MANIPULABILITY; MULTIPLE AGENTS; NP-HARD; NP-HARDNESS; REAL-WORLD; SIMPLE++; SINGLE-AGENT; VOTING RULES; WORST-CASE COMPLEXITY;

COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY;

EID: 77956035621     PISSN: 09226389     EISSN: 18798314     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.3233/978-1-60750-606-5-257     Document Type: Conference Paper

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