Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 144, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 96-119

  Moulin, Hervé ^a  

^a RICE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Asymptotic budget balance; Budget surplus or deficit; VCG mechanisms; Worst case analysis

Indexed keywords

EID: 57349128831     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.03.003     Document Type: Article

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