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Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 210-219

Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand

Author keywords

Inefficient allocation; Mechanism design; Payment redistribution; Vickrey Clarke Groves mechanism; Welfare maximization

Indexed keywords

ALLOCATION MECHANISM; FINITE SET; IS STRATEGY; MULTI-UNIT AUCTION; NET EFFECT; OPTIMIZATION MODELS; STRATEGY-PROOFNESS; VALUE FLOW; VCG MECHANISM; VICKREY-CLARKE-GROVES MECHANISM;

EID: 58849158537     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1386790.1386825     Document Type: Conference Paper
Times cited : (29)

References (20)
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