Incentive compatible regression learning

Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 884-893

  Dekel, Ofer ^a   Fischer, Felix ^b   Procaccia, Ariel D ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

LEARNING SYSTEMS;

INPUT SPACES; MACHINE-LEARNING; MULTIPLE AGENTS; PRIVATE INFORMATION; SINGLE POINT; VCG MECHANISM;

AGENTS;

EID: 58449102161     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (23)

1. M.-F. Balcan, A. Blum, J. D. Hartline, and Y. Mansour. Mechanism design via machine learning. In Proceedings of the 46th Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), pages 605-614. IEEE Press, 2005.
2. M. Barreno, B. Nelson, R. Sears, A. D. Joseph, and J. D. Tygar. Can machine learning be secure? In Proceedings of the 1st ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS), pages 16-25. ACM Press, 2006.
3. P. L. Bartlett and S. Mendelson. Rademacher and Gaussian complexìties: Rìsk bounds and structural results. Journal of Machine Learning Research, 3:463-482, 2003.
4. N. H. Bshouty, N. Eiron, and E. Kushilevitz. PAC learning with nasty noise. Theoretical Computer Science, 288(2):255-275, 2002.
5. E. H. Clarke. Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice, 11:17-33, 1971.
6. S. Dobzinski, N. Nisan, and M. Schapira. Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the 38th Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing (STOC), pages 644-652, 2006.
7. S. A. Goldman and R. H. Sloan. Can PAC learning algorithms tolerate random attribute noise? Algorithmica, 14(1):70-84, 1995.
8. T. Groves. Incentives in teams. Econometrica, 41:617-631, 1973.
9. D. Haussler. Decision theoretic generalization of the PAC model for neural net and other learning applications. Information and Computation, 100(1):78-150, 1992.
10. G. Kalai. Learnability and rationality of choice. Journal of Economic Theory, 113(1): 104-117, 2003.
11. M. Kearns and M. Li. Learning in the presence of malicious errors. SIAM Journal on Computing, 22(4):807-837, 1993.
12. D. Lehmann, L. I. O'Callaghan, and Y. Shoham. Truth revelation in rapid, approximately efficient combinatorial auctions. Journal of the ACM, 49(5):577-602, 2002.
13. N. Littlestone. Redundant noisy attributes, attribute errors, and linear-threshold learning using Winnow. In Proceedings of the 4th Annual Workshop on Computational Learning Theory (COLT), pages 147-156, 1991.
14. A. Mas-Colell, M. D. Whinston, and J. R. Green. Microeconomic Theory. Oxford University Press, 1995.
15. H. Moulin. Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences. Social Choice and Welfare, 1(2): 127-147, 1984.
16. N. Nisan. Introduction to mechanism design (for computer scientists). In N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, and V. Vazirani, editors, Algorithmic Game Theory, chapter 9. Cambridge University Press, 2007. To Appear.
17. N. Nisan and A. Ronen. Algorithmic mechanism design. In Proceedings of the 31st Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing (STOC), pages 129-140. ACM Press, 1999.
18. D. Pollard. Convergence of Stochastic Processes. Springer- Verlag, 1984.
19. A. D. Procaccia, A. Zohar, Y. Peleg, and J. S. Rosenschein. Learning voting trees. In Proceedings of the 22nd Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 110-115, 2007.
20. A. D. Procaccia, A. Zohar, and J. S. Rosenschein. Automated design of voting rules by learning from examples. In Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Computational Social Choice (COMSOC), pages 436-449, 2006.
21. M. Rothkopf. Thirteen reasons the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves process is not practical. Operations Research, 55(2):191-197, 2007.
22. J. Shawe-Taylor and N. Cristianini. Support Vector Machines and other Kernel Based Learning Methods. Cambridge University Press, 2000.
23. W. Vickrey. Counter speculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance, 16(1):8-37, 1961.