Mechanism design without money

Algorithmic Game Theory

Volumn 9780521872829, Issue , 2007, Pages 243-266

  Schummer, James ^a   Vohra, Rakesh V ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DOMINANT STRATEGY; IMPOSSIBILITY RESULTS; MECHANISM DESIGN; ORGAN DONATIONS; POLITICAL DECISION; RESTRICTED-DOMAIN; REVELATION PRINCIPLE; STRATEGY PROOFS;

MACHINE DESIGN;

EID: 84926076707     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511800481.012     Document Type: Chapter

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