Stackelberg vs. Nash in security games: Interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness

Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS

Volumn 2, Issue , 2010, Pages 1139-1146

  Yin, Zhengyu ^a   Korzhyk, Dmytro ^b   Kiekintveld, Christopher ^a   Conitzer, Vincent ^b   Tambe, Milind ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Nash Equilibrium; Security; Stackelberg Equilibrium

Indexed keywords

APPLICATION PROGRAMS; ARMOR; AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; GAME THEORY; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS; TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS;

NASH EQUILIBRIA; NASH EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES; RANDOMIZED STRATEGY; SECURITY; SECURITY APPLICATION; SELECTION PROBLEMS; STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM; STACKELBERG GAMES;

AIRPORT SECURITY;

EID: 80053434424     PISSN: 15488403     EISSN: 15582914     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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