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Games and Economic Behavior
Volumn 60, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 326-338
The value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly
Author keywords

Commitment; Contests; Costly leader games; Noisy leader games; Rent seeking; Tournaments
Indexed keywords

EID: 34447251248     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.10.009     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (35)
References (26)
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.