Games with imperfectly observable commitment

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 21, Issue 1-2, 1997, Pages 282-308

  Van Damme, Eric ^a   Hurkens, Sjaak ^b  

^a TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031256802     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0524     Document Type: Article

References (16)

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