Carbon allowance auction design: An assessment of options for the United States

Review of Environmental Economics and Policy

Volumn 5, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 25-43

  Lopomo, Giuseppe ^a   Marx, Leslie M ^a   McAdams, David ^a   Murray, Brian ^b  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EFFICIENCY MEASUREMENT; EMISSIONS TRADING; ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; GREENHOUSE GAS; POLLUTION TAX; REGULATORY APPROACH; TRADE-OFF;

UNITED STATES;

EID: 79960051048     PISSN: 17506816     EISSN: 17506824     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/reep/req024     Document Type: Article

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