Inefficiency of collusion at english auctions

Contributions to Theoretical Economics

Volumn 5, Issue 1, 2005, Pages

  Lopomo, Giuseppe ^a   Marshall, Robert C ^b   Marx, Leslie M ^a  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 21244484281     PISSN: 15345971     EISSN: 15345971     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1156     Document Type: Article

References (12)

1. Cramton, Peter, Robert Gibbons, and Paul Klemperer (1987), "Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently," Econometrica 55, 615-632.
2. General Accounting Office (1990), "Justice Department: Changes in Antitrust Enforcement Policies and Activities," GGD-91-2, October 29.
3. Graham, Daniel A. and Robert C. Marshall (1987), "Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second Price and English Auctions," Journal of Political Economy 95, 1217-1239.
4. Izmalkov, Sergei (2002), "English Auctions with Reentry," Working Paper, Pennsylvania State University.
5. Mailath, George J. and Peter Zemsky (1991), "Collusion in Second Price Auctions with Heterogeneous Bidders," Games and Economic Behavior 3, 467-486.
6. Maskin, Eric and John Riley (1984), "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica 52, 1473-1518.
7. Marshall, Robert C. and Leslie M. Marx (2004), "Bidder Collusion," Working Paper, Duke University.
8. Marshall, Robert C., Michael J. Meurer, Jean-Francois Richard, and Walter Stromquist (1994), "Numerical Analysis of Asymmetric First Price Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior 7, 193-220.
9. McAfee, R. Preston and John McMillan (1992), "Bidding Rings," American Economic Review 82, 579-599.
10. Milgrom, Paul R. and Robert J. Weber (1982), "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica 50, 1089-1122.
11. Myerson, Roger B. and Mark A. Satterthwaite (1983), "Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading," Journal of Economic Theory 29, 265-81.
12. Robinson, Marc S., "Collusion and the Choice of Auction," (1985), RAND Journal of Economics 16, 141-145.