Collusion via signalling in simultaneous ascending bid auctions with heterogeneous objects, with and without complementarities

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 69, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 407-436

  Brusco, Sandro ^a   Lopomo, Giuseppe ^b  

^a UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID   (Spain)

^b DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

MARKET SYSTEM; TRADE RELATIONS;

EID: 0036056577     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.00211     Document Type: Article

References (42)

1. Coordination in split award auctions
2. Multiproduct nonlinear pricing
3. Optimal multi-object auctions
4. Strategic jump bidding in English auctions
5. Bundling and optimal auctions of multiple products
6. Multiple object auctions with budget constrained bidders
7. Multimarket contact and collusive behavior
8. Implementation of reduced form auctions: A geometric approach
9. Collusion in auctions with externalities
10. Collusive bidding: Lessons from the FCC spectrum auctions
11. Efficient auctions
12. Learning to play the game
13. Multi-Unit auctions with uniform prices
14. Collusive bidder behavior at single-object second-price and English auctions
15. English and double auctions with differentiated commodities
16. Convex potential with an application to mechanism design
17. The english auction is optimal among simple sequential auctions
18. Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
19. The theory of general economic equilibrium: A differentiable approach
20. Putting auction theory to work: The simultaneous ascending
21. Bidding rings
22. Analyzing the airwaves auction
23. Optimal auction design
24. A study of collusion in first price auctions
25. Ironing, sweeping and multidimensional screening