Collusion in auctions for emission permits: An experimental analysis

Journal of Policy Analysis and Management

Volumn 28, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 672-691

  Burtraw, Dallas ^a   Goeree, Jacob ^b   Holt, Charles A ^c   Myers, Erica ^a   Palmer, Karen ^a   Shobe, William ^c  

^a RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE   (United States)

^b CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77049120278     PISSN: 02768739     EISSN: 15206688     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/pam.20460     Document Type: Article

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