The vulnerability of auctions to bidder collusion

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 124, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 883-910

  Marshall, Robert C ^a   Marx, Leslie M ^b  

^a PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 67650109920     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: 15314650     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/qjec.2009.124.2.883     Document Type: Article

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