Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints

Economic Theory

Volumn 38, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 105-124

  Brusco, Sandro ^a,b   Lopomo, Giuseppe ^c  

^a STONY BROOK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION   (Spain)

^c DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Budget constraints; Complementarities; Multiple object auctions

Indexed keywords

EID: 54249142592     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: 14320479     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-007-0217-8     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (19)

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