Do you not like Pigou, or do you not understand him? Tax aversion and revenue recycling in the lab

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volumn 62, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 53-64

  Kallbekken, Steffen ^a   Kroll, Stephan ^b   Cherry, Todd L ^c  

^a CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH OSLO CICERO   (Norway)

^b Department of Environmental and Radiological Health Sciences   (United States)

^c APPALACHIAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Behavioral economics; Experiments; Pigouvian tax; Tax aversion

Indexed keywords

BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS; EXTERNAL COSTS; NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES; PIGOUVIAN TAX; TAX AVERSION;

COMMERCE; ECONOMICS; EXPERIMENTS; RECYCLING;

TAXATION;

ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING; ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION; ENVIRONMENTAL TAX; RECYCLING; TAX INCENTIVE; VOTING BEHAVIOR; WILLINGNESS TO PAY;

EID: 79958859739     PISSN: 00950696     EISSN: 10960449     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2010.10.006     Document Type: Article

References (45)

1. A. Leiserowitz, E. Maibach, C. Roser-Renouf, N. Smith, Climate change in the American mind: public support for climate & energy policies in June 2010. Yale University and George Mason University. (Retrieved July 19 2010). Internet: http://environment.yale.edu/climate/files/PolicySupportJune2010.pdf.
2. TIME, TIME poll: global warming. Published 26.03.2006 (retrieved: October 12, 2009). Internet: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1176975-3,00.html.
3. Schuitema G., Steg L. The role of revenue use in the acceptability of transport pricing policies. Transportation Research Part F 2008, 11:221-231.
4. Baron J., Jurney J. Norms against voting for coerced reform. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1993, 64(3):347-355.
5. Fujii S., Gärling T., Jakobsson C., Jou R.C. A cross-country study of fairness and infringement on freedom as determinants of car owners acceptance of road pricing. Transportation 2004, 31:285-295.
6. Eriksson L., Garvill J., Nordlund A.M. Acceptability of travel demand management measures: the importance of problem awareness, personal norm, freedom, and fairness. Journal of Environmental Psychology 2006, 26:15-26.
7. Dresner S., Dunne L., Clinch P., Beuermann C. Social and political responses to ecological tax reform in Europe: an introduction to the special issue. Energy Policy 2006, 34:895-904.
8. Fehr E., Schmidt K.M. A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 1999, 114:817-868.
9. Baumol W.J., Oates W.E. The Theory of Environmental Policy 1988, Cambridge University Press. 2nd ed.
10. Rivlin A. The continuing search for a popular tax. American Economic Review 1989, 79:113-117.
11. Clinch J.P., Dunne L., Dresner S. Environmental and wider implications of political impediments to environmental tax reform. Energy Policy 2006, 34:960-970.
12. E.J. McCaffery, J. Baron, Heuristics and biases in thinking about tax, in: Proceedings: 96th Annual Conference on Taxation, Chicago, Illinois, November 13-15, 2003.
13. Wright K.K. Chipping away at propositions 5, 6, and 13. State Tax Notes 2003, 29:793-796.
14. Ross L., Ward A. Naive realism in everyday life: implications for social conflict and misunderstanding. Values and Knowledge 1996, Lawrence Erlbaum, New Jersey. E.S. Reed, E. Turell, T. Brown (Eds.).
15. Robinson A., Covey J., Spencer A., Loomes G. Are some deaths worse than others? The effect of 'labelling' on people perceptions. Journal of Economic Psychology 2010, 31:444-455.
16. M. Bütler, M.A. Maréchal, Framing effects in political decision making: evidence from a natural voting experiment, CESIFO Working Paper 1940, 2007.
17. Sausgruber R., Tyran J.-R. Testing the Mill hypothesis of fiscal illusion. Public Choice 2005, 122:39-68.
18. Kallbekken S., Kroll S., Cherry T.L. Pigouvian tax aversion and inequity aversion in the lab. Economics Bulletin 2010, 30:1914-1921.
19. Plott C.R. Externalities and corrective policies in experimental markets. Economic Journal 1983, 93:106-127.
20. Cummings R.G., Taylor L.O. Unbiased value estimates for environmental goods: a cheap talk design for the contingent valuation method. American Economic Review 1999, 89:649-665.
21. Aadland D., Caplan A.J. Cheap talk reconsidered: new evidence from CVM. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 2006, 60:562-678.
22. Brosig J., Ockenfels A., Weimann J. The effect of communication media on cooperation. German Economic Review 2003, 4:217-241.
23. Oxoby R.J., Spraggon J. The effects of recommended play on compliance with ambient pollution instruments. Experimental Methods, Environmental Economics 2007, Routledge Publishing. T.L. Cherry, S. Kroll, J.F. Shogren (Eds.).
24. Levin I., Schneider S.L., Gaeth G.J. All frames are not created equal: a typology and critical analysis of framing effects. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 1998, 76(2):149-188.
25. Eckel C.C., Grossman P.J., Johnston R.M. An experimental test of the crowding-out hypothesis. Journal of Public Economics 2005, 89:1543-1560.
26. Coase R.H. The problem of social cost. The Journal of Law & Economics 1960, 3:1-44.
27. Oates W.E. Green taxes: can we protect the environment and improve the tax system at the same time?. Southern Economic Journal 1995, 61:914-922.
28. Tyran J.-R., Sausgruber R. The diffusion of policy innovation-an experimental investigation. Journal of Evolutionary Economics 2005, 15:423-442.
29. R. Durante, L. Putterman, Preferences for redistribution and perceptions of fairness: an experimental study, Brown University, Department of Economics, Working Paper 2007:13, 2007.
30. Ackert L.F., Martinez-Vazquez J., Rider M. Social preferences and tax policy design: some experimental evidence. Economic Inquiry 2007, 45:487-501.
31. Alm J., McClelland G.H., Schultze W.D. Changing social norms of tax compliance by voting. Kyklos 1999, 52:141-171.
32. Sutter M., Weck-Hannemann H. On the effects of asymmetric and endogenous taxation in experimental public goods games. Economic Letters 2003, 79:59-67.
33. Tyran J.-R., Feld L. Achieving compliance when legal sanctions are non-deterrent. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 2006, 108:135-156.
34. Kroll S., Cherry T.L., Shogren J.F. Voting, punishment and public goods. Economic Inquiry 2007, 10:411-428.
35. Smith V., Williams A.W., Bratton W.K., Vannoni M.G. Competitive market institutions: double auctions vs. sealed bid-offer auctions. American Economic Review 1982, 72(1):58-77.
36. Fischbacher U. Z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Experimental Economics 2007, 10:171-178.
37. Fischer.A.J. A further experimental study of expressive voting. Public Choice 1996, 88:171-180.
38. Hong C.S., Konrad K. Bandwagon effects and two-party majority voting. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 1998, 16:165-172.
39. Feddersen T., Pesendorfer W. Voting behavior and information aggregation in elections with private information. Econometrica 1997, 65:1029-1058.
40. Gschwend.T. Ticket-splitting and strategic voting under mixed electoral rules: evidence from Germany. European Journal of Political Research 2007, 46:1-23.
41. T.L. Cherry, S. Kroll, Crashing the party: an experimental investigation of strategic voting in primary elections, Public Choice 114 (2003) 387-420.
42. Glazer.A. An expressive voting theory of strikes. Economic Inquiry 1992, 30:733-741.
43. Tyran J.-R. Voting when money and morals conflict: an experimental test of expressive voting. Journal of Public Economics 2004, 88:1645-1664.
44. Kahneman D., Tversky A. Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica 1979, 47:263-292.
45. Bolton G.E., Ockenfels A. ERC: a theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition. American Economic Review 2000, 90:166-193.