The effects of recommended play on compliance with ambient pollution instruments

Environmental Economics, Experimental Methods

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 307-323

  Oxoby, Robert J ^a   Spraggon, John ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84917122382     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203935361     Document Type: Chapter

References (22)

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