Testing the Mill hypothesis of fiscal illusion

Public Choice

Volumn 122, Issue 1-2, 2005, Pages 39-68

  Sausgruber, Rupert ^a   Tyran, Jean Robert ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF INNSBRUCK   (Austria)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ST GALLEN   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 23744469225     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-3992-4     Document Type: Article

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