A Model of Public Consultation: Why is Binary Communication so Common?

Economic Journal

Volumn 121, Issue 553, 2011, Pages 819-842

  Kawamura, Kohei ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMMUNICATION BEHAVIOR; HETEROGENEITY; INFORMATION;

EID: 79957962960     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: 14680297     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011.02436.x     Document Type: Article

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